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1 Introduction
Ian Hacking (e.g. 1986, 1995b) uses the looping effect to characterize a phenom-
enon that underlies many social constructivist arguments. The looping effect
describes the interaction between classifications and the targeted “kinds of
people” or human kinds that purportedly share behaviour and traits. The idea is
that classificatory practices induce reactions in the members of the human kind
by enabling new intentional ways of being and acting. Tracking these changes
requires revisions in the original classification, which may in turn lead to further
changes in the members of the kind. Consequently, the interaction between the
classification and the affectedmembers of the human kind creates a feedback loop
that renders the kind a moving target. According to Hacking, this classificatory
instability generated by the looping effect distinguishes the human sciences from
the natural sciences. In particular, the interactive human kinds studied by
the human sciences do not support the robust explanations, predictions and
interventions (i.e. epistemic projects) that the natural kinds picked out by the
natural sciences do.
Hacking’s description of the looping effect has instigated a debate over
whether human kinds can be given a realistic interpretation. Cooper (2004) and
Khalidi (2010) argue for a realist view on the basis that also some prototypical
natural kinds are subject to the looping effect, such as domesticated animals
and disease entities. Moreover, Murphy (2006) asserts that looping effects can
stabilize human kinds, and Mallon (2016) argues that in general our knowledge
can keep up with their rate of change. However, Allen (2018) and Laimann (2018)
argue that although some biological kinds are subject to the looping effect,
interactive human kinds differ from interactive biological kinds because their
classificatory-induced reactions are difficult to explain and predict. Allen
associates the problem with classificatory-induced intentional reactions being
ontologically anomalous, whereas Laimann associates it with the complex social
interactions that underlie our inability to find mechanisms of change and sta-
bility. In sum, the looping debate is based on the dichotomy of whether inter-
active human kinds are real kinds that support robust epistemic projects.1
Nevertheless, the discussion has mainly concentrated on whether looping effects
are problematic for epistemic projects. My aim is to identify how knowledge of
looping effects can enhance and supplement explanations of interactive human
kinds.
1 I use the term ‘real kind’ to cover all the kinds that ground robust epistemic projects.
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I defend a realist interpretation of interactive human kinds by arguing for an
explanatory domain account of the looping effect. I assert that knowledge of
the feedback mechanisms that mediate the looping effect can supplement the
explanatory domain over which a kind and its variations are accountable. I begin
by reviewing Hacking’s description of the looping effect and the discussion it has
instigated. I then argue that intentionally mediated looping effects are causally
explanatory and hence the ontology of human kinds is irrelevant to my explana-
tory account. Next, based on the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation
(Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2007), as well as on the property cluster view of natural
kinds (Boyd 1999), I assert that mechanistic explanations of human kinds have
applicability domains over which they stably account for the kinds’ properties
under counterfactual situations. The applicability domain is better when it holds
over more properties of the kind in a wider range of alternative situations. This
means that explanations of a homeostatic property cluster kind fall on a contin-
uum of goodness described by the applicability domain. The idea is that a better
mechanistic explanation of a kind enables more secure domain-relative pro-
jections (i.e. generalizations and predictions) based on the kind. Moreover, an
explanation ideally spells out its applicability domain because human kinds
support limited epistemic projects. In that case, classificatory projects that apply
the explanation do not exceed the limits of their own applicability. Based on this
account, I argue that knowledge of feedback mechanisms can supplement the
domain over which a human kind is explainable by accounting for some of its
dynamic properties and identifying the limits of the domain’s applicability.
Nevertheless, the actual explanatory relevance of a feedback mechanism is an
empirical question because interactive human kinds are affected in different ways
and to different degrees by looping effects.
In the last section, by applying the explanatory domain account to cross-
cultural case studies of psychiatric disorders, I argue that there are two types of
feedback mechanisms that mediate the looping effect. Congruent feedback
mechanisms describe matches between classifications and kinds. They can
supplement explaining, for instance, the cross-cultural variation of schizo-
phrenia. On the other hand, incongruent feedback mechanisms describe
mismatches between classifications and kinds. They can help to identify
unintentional misclassifications and their effects, or more problematically for
epistemic projects, value-driven classificatory and behaviour adjustments. For
example, classificatory practices that disregard culture-dependent manifesta-
tions of disorders exceed their applicability and hence cause incongruence.
Finally, I suggest that knowledge of the feedback mechanisms facilitates
classificatory adjustments and interventions on interactive kinds such as
psychiatric disorders.
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2 The Looping Effect and Interactive Kinds
2.1 The Looping Effect, Interactive Kinds and Realism
The looping effect’s plausibility as a demarcation criterion between the natural
and human sciences depends on the nature of the generated instability and
whether it prevents interactive kinds from being real kinds. As examples of the
kinds subject to the looping effect, Hacking (1995b, p. 351–352) has concentrated
on “kinds of people” defined by their behaviour, condition, actions, tendencies,
emotion and experience. For example, he has provided case studies of psychiatric
disorders, such as fugue, multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia and
autism spectrum, in addition to cases like teenage pregnancy, child abuse and
homosexuality (see Hacking 1986, 1995a, 1998, 1999). According to the analyses,
classificatory activities have affected the targeted kinds to such a degree, that the
classifications have had to be amended.
Hacking has provided a particularly detailed analysis of the looping effect of
multiple personality disorder (Hacking 1995a). Until the end of the 1970s, the
diagnosis was based on individuals having two or three alternating personalities.
However, once knowledge about the syndrome spread among specialists, media
and lay people, the number of diagnoses as well as the diversity and number of
alters associated with the syndrome started to increase. Hacking argues that
popular knowledge about the syndrome created a prototype, which in turn
induced more people to conform with it or otherwise react to it in varied ways.
These reactions needed to be explained and to be integrated into the classification,
which again affected the syndrome. Consequently, by the 1990s people were
diagnosed with having hundreds of fragmented alters.
The reactions generated by the looping effect should be distinguished from at
least two other ways in which kinds can change. First, the kindmay change within
the range set by the classification for non-classificatory reasons, and therefore
there is no need to amend the classification. Second, the kind may change outside
the range set by the classification for non-classificatory reasons. In such a case, the
classificationmay need to be amended tomatch the changes. However, I am solely
concerned with the third type of case, where the targeted kind is affected by the
classification and may change because of it.
Although Hacking’s examples mostly concern scientific classificatory
practices and their objects, folk categories and their objects are subject to the
looping effect as well. In general, scientific classifications reinforce and sharpen
the boundaries of pre-existing folk categories or create new categories that
become folk categories (see Root 2000, p. 631). An example of the former is
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psychiatric disorder terms. Madness was historically an unspecified folk cate-
gory that has become increasingly sharpened and recategorized due to scientific
research, thereby affecting the behaviour of the classified people. Hacking (1986,
2002) describes homosexuality as an example of the latter. Following Foucault
(1978), Hacking argues that the homosexual as a kind of person only came into
being through legal and medical thinking. Subsequently, the kind of person was
transformed when individuals began to adjust their self-descriptions and actions
in reaction to the classification and emergent prototypes. Finally, the ‘gay
movement’ changed the values and beliefs associated with the classification.
A classification may either generate merely reactions from the classified or
also genuinely shape the attributes targeted by the classification. In the first case,
a classification may prompt reactions due to the status or stigma associated
with it, while the targeted kind-typical behaviour is not affected. According to
Hacking (1999, p. 114), for instance, once auditory hallucinations became an
integral part of schizophrenia diagnosis, people ceased to report them. This in
turn led to their diminished importance in the diagnosis. In the more substantive
feedback effects, classifications and associated stereotypes influence the
behaviour and content of the kinds targeted by the classification. Along these
lines, Hacking (1999, p. 114) mentions that the content of the hallucinations
also changed due to becoming diagnostically important. In such cases, the
classification does not merely successfully or unsuccessfully pick out a
pre-existing kind, but is part of the casual structure of the social world, and
may prompt reactions that lead to changes in the kind as well as the classification
itself. If the classification is perceived as amatch andmeaningful to the classified
and the larger social audience, it may generate congruence (i.e. conformity
with the classification), while a perceived mismatch may lead to capricious
behaviour and increased incongruence (i.e. nonconformity) (see Table 1 and
Section 3.2).
Classifications of human kinds induce reactions primarily because they are
value-laden (Hacking 1995b: 370). Although Hacking concentrates mostly on
negatively value-laden classifications, positively viewed human groupings,
especially ones that have political importance, are also subject to the looping
Table : Looping effects.
Status reaction Kind looping
Perceived match No modification Congruence
Perceived mismatch Classificatory modification Incongruence
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effect.2 This is exemplified by how the idea of an aristocrat as a kind of person was
connected with high expectations concerning character and behaviour. The
expression noblesse oblige, for example, describes the conferred social obligations
that were associatedwith aristocratic titles. These perceived obligations interacted
with the behavioural patterns and traits of the aristocrats.
The looping effect seems to challenge classificatory (or kind) realism in the
human sciences. In general, realism about natural kinds can be approached from
an essentialist or naturalist perspective (Bird and Tobin 2008; Kornblith 1993;
Reydon 2009). The essentialist approach defines kinds as natural, based on shared
necessary and sufficient conditions that are determined by underlying intrinsic
properties (Ellis 2001; Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975). In addition, according to this
approach, natural kinds are usually thought to be upheld by laws of nature. On the
other hand, a weaker form of realism defends natural kinds from an epistemic and
naturalistic point of view without committing itself to essentialism. It stresses how
natural kinds ground inductive inferences, explanations and predictions (Boyd
1999; Dupré 1993; Millikan 1999). In short, according to naturalism, natural kinds
are needed to explainwhy some scientific classifications ground epistemic projects
more than others. According to Hacking, however, neither approach is applicable
to the kinds targeted by the looping effect.
Hacking (1983, 1991, 2007a) maintains that there are no prepackaged kinds
united by their common naturalness, but instead there are different ways of
classifying that correspond with the varying nature of the targeted kinds. Some
natural kinds classified by the natural sciences are better described according to
the essentialist approach, while others according to the naturalist tradition
(Hacking 1991, p. 123).3 Butmore importantly, whereas the natural kinds studied in
the natural sciences are indifferent to our classifications and manipulations,
classificatory activities in the human sciences lead to the looping effect that ren-
ders the targeted human kinds moving targets or interactive kinds (Hacking 1999).
The reason is that social phenomena do not constrain classificatory possibilities to
the same extent as natural phenomena (Martínez 2009, p. 214). Because of the
dynamic nature of the kinds studied by the human sciences, Hacking has labelled
his view as dynamic nominalism. In short, he uses the looping effect to draw a
principal distinction between the instability of interactive kinds and the stability of
natural or indifferent kinds.
The argument from the looping effect to non-realness (or nonnaturalness) of
interactive kinds is not straightforward. Clearly, because the looping effect may
2 Hacking (1997, 2007a) mentions “genius” for romantics as an example.
3 Lately Hacking (2007b) has argued that the concept of natural kind has become obsolete
because of the confusion it creates.
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lead to property changes, interactive kinds cannot be essential kinds. However, it
is not clear why the looping effect would preclude all interactive kinds from
grounding robust epistemic projects. Hence, there is an ontological and an
epistemic question that require clarification: what renders interactive kinds sus-
ceptible to the looping effect, and why would their instability be epistemically
problematic for classifications? The questions are co-dependent, but it is analyt-
ically helpful to keep them separate.
2.2 The Looping Debate
Hacking’s account of the looping effect has stirred a debate over whether
the affected kinds can be given a realistic interpretation. Critics argue that the
looping effect does not preclude human kinds from being real kinds because some
prototypical natural kinds are interactive and some looping effects of human kinds
are mediated by environmental changes. For example, Douglas (1986, p. 101) has
pointed out that microbes adjust themselves to our classificatory and medical
interventions. Especially Cooper (2004) andKhalidi (2010, 2013) have developed
this idea by arguing that the looping effect is not restricted to the examples
involving human behaviour that Hacking offers, but affects biological kinds as
well. For instance, labelling some species as domestic animals has led to selective
breeding, which in turn has eventually created new breeds of dogs and cats, for
example. Consequently,wehave had to adopt new labels and taxonomies tomatch
these changes. Similarly, labelling bacteria and viruses as diseases leads to
medical interventions that change them through natural selection. This in turn
requires adjustments in treatments and labels. The gist of Khalidi’s and Cooper’s
argument is that since some biological kinds clearly ground inductive inferences
and explanations, there is no reason why other interactive kinds cannot do the
same.
Hacking (1999, p. 106), however, has pointed out that genuine looping ef-
fects are mediated by the awareness of being classified, thereby distinguishing
interactive kinds ontologically from indifferent kinds. This interpretation is
supported by Hacking’s (1986, 1995a, ch. 7) relying on Ascombe’s theory of
intentional action under a description. Once a new description, associated with a
classification, becomes socially available, it prompts reactions by enabling new
conceptual possibilities for being and acting. These new actions, in turn, render
the kind a moving target. Cooper (2004) and Khalidi (2013), nevertheless, argue
that even according to Hacking himself humans need not always be aware of the
classification for it to influence their kind-typical behaviour. For instance, a
child labelled as having attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) may be
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placed in a school where “stimulant-free schoolrooms” influence her behaviour
(Hacking 1999, p. 103). Similarly, an individual can acquire refugee characteristics
by being part of a refugee group (Hacking 1999, p. 32). Furthermore, realists
argue that most of the time the instigated changes in human kinds are not fast
enough to rule out epistemic projects (Mallon 2016), and looping effects can be
stabilizing as well as destabilizing (Griffiths 1997; Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen 2012;
Murphy 2006).
However, Laimann (2018) and Allen (2018) have argued that interactive
human kinds differ from non-human kinds because they are prone to wayward
behaviour. Laimann (2018) argues that looping effects render human kinds
epistemically capricious because their behaviour often invalidates existing clas-
sifications and knowledge about them. She associates the problem with the
complex nature of human interactions that undermine our ability to discover
mechanisms that underlie patterns of change and stability. Allen (2018) comes to
the same conclusion by arguing that intentional action is ontologically different
because it enables humans to fake or be mistaken over their kind membership.
Arguably, these creative reactions are harder to predict and rectify than mistakes
over non-human (or non-aware) classifications.
These problems are not restricted to feedback effects that are mediated by
subjective awareness on the part of the classified individuals. For example,
apparently one of the reasons for the ADHD epidemic in the USA is that some
schools and caretakers pressure clinicians for diagnoses to obtain medicine and
improved learning facilities (e.g. tutoring, smaller classes) for children (First 2017).
This makes misdiagnoses probable, leading to general diagnostic distortions.
These problematic feedback loops can also occur when children act under the
description of ADHD, without being explicitly aware of the classificatory
description. It is enough that they learn the characteristic action pattern from the
people in their “in-group”. In fact, it is probable that a person’s symptom profile
depends on the specifics of themediating feedbackmechanisms and their complex
interactions with the underlying psychological and neurocognitive processes, as
well as on the larger social and cultural forces.
In conclusion, the creative and complex nature of human reactions to being
classified complicates our ability to explain and predict kind-typical behaviour.
However, in the next section, I argue that interactive human kinds, and the
intentional actions that generate them, do not require a different type of expla-
nation from non-intentional explanations. Therefore, the question about the
ontological difference of interactive human kinds can be set aside. In the third
section, I defend an explanatory account of feedback effects according to which
166 T. Vesterinen
their complexity does not preclude interactive human kinds from sustaining
scientifically relevant epistemic projects.
2.3 Explanation and Epistemic Instability
The looping effect as a demarcation thesis can either be interpreted as a strong
claim in favour of anti-naturalism about explanation, or as a weaker argument
about causal construction which is compatible with naturalism. The former would
mean that the ontological nature of human kinds in principle precludes them from
being real kinds, whereas according to the latter approach the problem is not
principal, but instead an epistemic problem due to causal complexity.
As an anti-naturalistic argument, the looping effect would be a thesis in favour
of non-naturalist interpretivism, and would support the separation between the
kinds studied by the human and natural sciences. Interpretivists generally
argue that humans are self-interpreting, and therefore understanding intentional
action requires interpreting its meaning to the agent, instead of explaining it by
causes or laws (e.g. Geertz 1973; Taylor 1971; Winch 1958). Moreover, arguably
interpretations need to account for the culturally situated and holistically deter-
mined beliefs, concepts, categories and the like. Thesemake actionsmeaningful to
agents and understandable, in the light of their context, to observers. Hence, one
could hold that the efforts to explain human groups with causal generalizations
induce new self-interpretations whereas the aim should be to understand the
humans according to their own meanings and concepts. The problem is that this
muddles the distinction between classifications and kinds. One way to understand
the problem is that interpretivism seems to set the produced action in a conceptual
(or quasi-logical) connection with its reasons (von Wright 1971). That is, while
actions are identified based on the agent’s own reasons (i.e. beliefs and desires),
those reasons can only be established based on the actions they are reasons for (see
Rosenberg 2016, ch. 3). Consequently, behaviour could be interpreted and
conceptualized only in retrospect, making objective and generalizable classifica-
tions virtually impossible. Lastly, the conceptual connection could describe how
classifications constitute human kinds, not only how they can be explained.
Nevertheless, in all these cases, generalizations of human kinds would be mostly
exhausted by their classificatory descriptions, and hence would not be real kinds
that ground robust projections.
In the following, I will first argue against the non-naturalist explanatory view
of the looping effect, and thereafter against the stronger constitutive view. The
general view in the philosophy of social sciences is that reasons can function as
causes in explanations and that interpretation and causal explanation need not
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be mutually exclusive (Henderson 1993; Kincaid 1996; Tuomela 1977; Ylikoski
2001). As an example, when an anthropologist conducts fieldwork by interpreting
local customs and behaviours, she relies on the causal efficacy of cultural struc-
tures and beliefs. Especially the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation
(Ylikoski 2001; Woodward 2000, 2015) matches the thesis that explanations in the
social and natural sciences do not differ in key features. According to the theory,
explanations provide descriptions of objective causal (and constitutional)
relations by describing counterfactual dependencies that answer what-if-things-
had-been-different questions (what if-question). Explanations, in addition, have a
contrastive structure, so that they answer questions of why fact rather than foil.
The contrastive structure makes explicit the aspects to be explained and thereby
determineswhether a putative explanation is relevant. Hence, reasons are causally
explanatory because they can provide counterfactual information on why some-
one acted in one way rather than another. This means that a putative intentional
explanation is explanatory if it can answer questions concerning how the
explanandum action would have been different, had the relevant beliefs and de-
sires been different (see Ylikoski 2001, p. 97). In this light, a putative feedback
explanation is explanatory if it can describe how a difference in classificatory
related conceptions and beliefs would have made a difference to the behaviour of
the classified people. But having said that, understanding the causal process may
require resorting also to lower-level explanations as well as structural
explanations.
The constitutive view of human kinds can be understood as a form of
conventionalism (cf. Kornblith 1993). A strong interpretation of conventionalism
would mean that human kinds are merely subjective distinctions or groupings
made by scientists qua scientists. However, this would trivialize human kinds to
the extent that kind membership would be merely a matter of opinion or opinions
(see Griffiths 1997, p. 198). A weaker conventionalism would mean that interactive
human kinds are akin to institutional facts which, according to Searle (1996), are
epistemically objective although constituted by collective acceptance. Crucially,
however, interactive human kinds are not constituted merely by collective repre-
sentations, or by representations in the minds of scientists qua scientists, but also
by the behavioural patterns and traits they bring about. Thus, the conceptions and
beliefs associated with the label multiple personality disorder do not constitute
multiples as kinds of people, but those beliefs as part of classificatory practices
(treatments, institutional infrastructures, etc.) and prototypical expectations, may
constrain, shape and enable kind-typical behaviours and traits. This is exemplified
in how a posteriori research is needed to uncover the reasons that brought about
the behavioural pattern or its reinforcement. And since I already argued that
reasons can function as causes in kind explanations, nothing in principle prevents
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looping effects from describing causal interactions between classificatory de-
scriptions and human kinds.
Shared conceptions may nonetheless be necessary to enable the complex
social interactive processes that bring about and sustain human kinds. However, it
is not plausible that new human kinds and kind-typical actions are born simply
from conceptual stipulations. Instead, it seems credible that there are different
degrees of conceptually and socially induced kind-typical intentional actions. This
means that novel kinds come about incrementally, so that the kind and its
conception are egging one another on in various ways. As an example, the diag-
nostic category of ADHD has grown more specific through institutional and social
interactions (Lakoff 2000). In addition, kind-typical intentional actions may
become possible before their linguistic expressions. The idea is that feedback
processes of social interactions can brings about human kinds by generating
compelling emotional experiences (see Collins 2004, p. xii). For instance, Siegel
(1997) argues that Indonesian national identity first guided behaviour rather as a
structure of feeling than as an explicit category.
The antirealist view of interactive human kinds can also be defended natu-
ralistically so that the looping effect is a form of causal construction that
destabilizes the affected kinds (see Hacking 1995b, p. 362). However, those who
take a realist approach to human kinds argue that looping effects can be stabilizing
and that in general our theoretical knowledge can keep upwith their rate of change
(Mallon 2016; cf. Murphy 2001). Laimann (2018) claims, instead, that interactive
human kinds are generally capricious and problematic for epistemic projects
because of the difficulty in discovering themechanisms that underlie their patterns
of change and stability. The reason is that feedback mechanisms can interact in
complex and unpredictable ways with each other, and with larger social circum-
stances. Consequently, she argues that secure extrapolations based on kinds in the
human sciences are difficult if not impossible. This interpretationwouldmean that
human kinds are historical in the sense that we can explain their alterations and
context dependent stability only in retrospect.
I agree with Laimann’s general idea to the extent that our ability to explain
human kinds and their property variations, rather than the superficial stability of
the kinds by itself, is the key to measuring the epistemic stability and scientific
relevance of human kinds. This means that knowing how the kind would vary
under different circumstances supports its realist interpretation. However, since I
have argued that there is nothing in principle preventing human kinds from
supporting epistemic projects, whether they do support projects is an empirical
question. Next, I argue that the looping effect’s explanatory relevance, and the
epistemic projects that the human kinds support, are not all or nothing matters.
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3 An Explanatory Account of the Looping Effect
3.1 Explanatory Domain of Feedback Mechanisms
In this section, I argue for an explanatory domain approach to the looping effect.
A common realist approach to interactive human kinds has been to interpret them
as homeostatic property clusters (HPC view) (Griffiths 1997; Hauswald 2016;
Kokkonen and Koskinen 2016; Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen 2012; Pöyhönen 2013).
According to the HPC view (Boyd 1999), natural kinds consist of homeostatic
property clusters that are reliably generated by causal mechanisms. The members
of a kind may share different properties and the members as well as the kind may
change over time. The HPC view can accommodate social mechanisms as external
mechanisms that maintain property clusters (Boyd 1991; Mallon 2003). Moreover,
it is commonly argued that uncovering social mechanisms enables extrapolations
(Elster 2015; cf. Steel 2008).4 According to Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen (2012, p. 191),
the reason is that identifying underlying mechanisms, not merely patterns and
regularities, enables inferences to alternative situations. They point out that this
matches the HPC view’s idea that while causal mechanisms explain the clustering
of properties, the clusters together with their mechanistic explanations enable
secure extrapolations and projections (see also Reydon 2009). Therefore, the more
we learn about the mechanisms that generate property clusters, the more securely
we can extrapolate that token clusters are of the same type. Moreover, when a
specimen is identified as a member of a well explained kind, we can reliably
generalize and predict its behaviour based on that membership.
My account is that the looping effect is mediated in some cases by feedback
mechanisms that can supplement explaining the clustering of properties of human
kinds. A model of the mechanism(s) that generates a property cluster human kind
ideally specifies adomain of applicability overwhich it stably explains the kind and
its property variations. The domain of applicability has a scope and a depth
dimension (cf. Griffiths 1999, p. 217). The scope dimension describes the actual
properties, places, and times where the explanation is applicable. For instance, an
explanation can cover some properties of a human kind for a determined duration
and location. The depth dimension describes the counterfactual stability of the
explanatory relation, that is, how dependent the inferences that the explanation
enables are on non-included situations. My argument is that explanations of a
homeostatic property cluster fall on a continuum of explanatory power or good-
ness described by the domain of applicability and the contrastive-counterfactual
4 Roughly, a social mechanism can be said to consist of individual agents whose relations and
actions are responsible for a social phenomenon, see Hedström and Ylikoski (2010).
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theory. Nevertheless, a mechanistic model of a kind is explanatorily relevant only
if it can systematically account for some of the kind’s properties under counter-
factual situations. This would mean that the mechanistic generalization is stable
(i.e. invariant) under hypothetical interventions (Woodward 2000). Crucially,
applicability domains are limited in the human sciences because social phe-
nomena are contingent on complex circumstances. Thus, an explanation can
exceed the limits of its spatial and temporal applicability by disregarding the
dynamic nature of the targeted kind. An explanation should therefore make
explicit and explain why the given applicability domain is optimal for the set of
phenomena. This is tantamount to identifying better the limits of the underlying
causal mechanistic structure of the phenomena. Hence, if feedback mechanisms
are part of the causal structure of human kinds, knowledge about them can sup-
port more secure domain-relative extrapolations and projections.
The explanatory domain of applicability can be illustrated with Luhrmann
et al.’s (2015) study on the nature of the hallucinatory voices schizophrenia
patients hear in the USA, Ghana and India. The study indicates that the voice-
hearing experiences are exceptionally harsh in the USA in comparison to Ghana
and India. The study seems to suggest that one of the reasons for the harsh voices
in the USA is a feedback mechanism between the prototypical expectations
associated with the diagnostic category and the hallucinatory voices. In this light,
the feedback explanation’s scope is the nature of the hallucinatory voices
schizophrenia patients hear in the USA during a specified time-scale, whereas the
explanatory relation is counterfactually relatively stable given that the diagnostic
expectations are institutionally and socially entrenched. This means that if we or
some social process were to manipulate the diagnostic expectations during that
time, the nature of the voice-hearing experiences would change. Finally, such an
explanation should spell out why its scope is limited to the USA and whether it
has exceptions. Moreover, it should be established that the explanatory depth is
correct for the explanation’s scope, so that, for example, lower-level details, such
as schizophrenia’s different genetic subtypes, are irrelevant to explaining the
voices in the USA in contrast to India and Ghana.
The explanatory domain account offers a method for identifying how relevant
a feedback effect is in explaining a human kind (cf. Pöyhönen 2010, 2014). A stable
feedback explanation can supplement the domain of applicability of a kind
explanation. Alternatively, knowledge of a feedback effect may help to identify
how a putative explanation is unstable. Furthermore, feedback explanations fall
on horizontal and vertical axes that represent their ability to supplement the
applicability domain. An explanation is enhanced horizontally by widening its
scope, or vertically by providing a deeper explanation within the scope. Although
it is commonly argued that wider explanations are less deep, I rely in my
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explanatory analysismostly on strong complementarity (Marchionni 2008), so that
relevant feedback explanations can enhance both dimensions. This strategy
is important for explaining interactive kinds that have inseparable biological,
psychological and social properties. In such cases, integrating higher-level ex-
planations, such as feedback mechanisms, with lower-level ones, can strengthen
the explanation’s applicability domain. In the schizophrenia case, the feedback
mechanism canboth provide a deeper explanation of the disorder’s core symptoms
in the USA, as well as account for why the explanation’s scope is limited to the
USA.
The depth dimension of a feedback mechanism’s explanatory domain can
be further explicated with the contrastive-counterfactual theory. The depth of an
explanation depends on how many relevant what if-questions it can answer.
Thus, a better explanation of a property cluster kind answersmore counterfactual
questions because it locates the kind within a larger space of alternative
possibilities. A feedback explanation can contribute to the explanation by
providing fine-grained information of the counterfactual dependence between
classificatory descriptions and properties of the kind. In this case, the feedback
generalization describes how the kind would change, if its classification were to
change in diverse ways, and vice versa. This counterfactual dependence can be
explicated with explanatory insensitivity and precision.5 The insensitivity of an
explanation describes the invariance of the explanation under different back-
ground conditions (Woodward 2000; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). In other
words, if a feedback mechanismmakes a difference to the targeted aspects of the
human kind (i.e. the explanandum), including it into explaining the kind (instead
of leaving it as a background condition) would enable the explanation to answer
more what if-questions. An explanation of schizophrenia that includes a feed-
back explanation of diagnostic expectations is more insensitive if the expecta-
tions make a difference to the psychiatric disorder. The explanation’s precision
describes its ability to characterize in a fine-grained way why something is
the case in contrast to something else (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). In the
schizophrenia case, the feedback explanation could make an explanation of the
psychiatric disorder more precise by describing in (more) detail the nature of
schizophrenia voices in the USA in contrast to their nature in India and Ghana, or
better still, everywhere.
The applicability domains of feedback explanations can also be roughly
compared. For instance, since severe autism has a strong neurobiological basis,
and the individual’s ability to communicate is limited, looping effects are not
mediated by intentional reactions. The looping effect may nonetheless explain
5 Other explanatory virtues could be relevant as well, see Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010).
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some behavioural responses to the actions of caretakers and environmental
changes (Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen 2012). Moreover, a classificatory feedback
explanation of pathogenic bacteria can supplement evolutionary explanations to
account for antibiotic resistance. Nevertheless, the feedback explanation alone is
unable to explain how subtle differences in classification would have made a
difference to the bacteria. In sum, these feedback explanations are not as stable as
the feedback explanation of schizophrenia.
Classificatory feedback mechanisms can be compared with self-fulfilling
prophecies. They are based on expectations becoming a key component of the
causal mechanism that generates the expected outcome (see Biggs 2009). This
means that the prophecy can be invalidated if relevant people learn to intervene on
the mediating causal mechanism. Consequently, if classificatory feedback mech-
anisms are self-fulfilling prophecies, disseminating knowledge about them could
diffuse their causal efficacy. However, a classificatory feedback explanation’s
causal power to diffuse itself is limited. As Mallon (2016) argues, many social
categories are firmly entrenched in larger social and material environments,
thereby restricting one’s space for action even if one becomes aware of their social
nature. This is one of the reasons why true social change requires a highly
concerted effort. Conversely, not just any enforced expectation or arbitrary claim
will initiate a kind shaping or enabling looping effect. The reason is that feedback
mechanisms bring about or reinforce interactive properties of kinds by interacting
with other factors. It is commonly agreed, for example, that psychiatric disorders
need multifactorial explanations that combine social, psychological and biolog-
ical causal mechanisms and causes (Kendler, Zachar and Craver 2011).
The modularity requirement for mechanistic models provides a way to un-
derstand the limits of feedback explanations. According to Woodward (2002), a
model is modular if an intervention on a putative cause does not alter the subse-
quent causal relations in the underlying structure of the represented causal
mechanism. The unaltered causal structure ensures that the model can predict the
outcome of an intervention. Building on this idea, Steel (2006) argues that some
interventions in the human sciences violate modularity because they are structure
altering.6 This means that the interventions cause unpredictable changes in the
causal relations between the parts comprising the modelled social mechanism. In
this light, the looping effect describes how classifications as part of classificatory or
bureaucratic practices (understood as interventions here) alter the structure of
interactive kinds inadvertently. The reason can either be epistemic, as argued here,
so that sometimes the changes can be explained and anticipated by unboxing the
mediating feedback mechanisms and their interactions with other mechanisms.
6 Such critiques have been influential in economics, see Lucas (1976) and MacKenzie (2008).
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On the other hand, antirealists seem to claim either that the interactions are too
complex to be modular, or that human reactivity eschews modularity in principle.
This would also mean that if a putative feedback explanation is incorporated in
classificatory practices, it will become less explanatory by breaching the original
feedback structure. However, whether a feedback structure can be modelled so
that it enables some interventions, is ultimately an empirical question. Indeed, a
model need not provide a complete description of a feedback system, and its
interaction with other mechanisms, to enable domain-relative interventions and
causal predictions. Next, I provide some empirical evidence that knowledge of
the feedback mechanisms’ applicability domains facilitates explanations and
predictions of interactive kinds as well as interventions on them.
3.2 Congruent and Incongruent Feedback Mechanisms
In the following, I employ empirical case studies to argue that the looping effect
is mediated by congruent and incongruent feedback mechanisms. They are
abstract and rough models that need to be filled with empirical details to generate
generalizations and predictions. Understanding these feedback mechanisms is
especially relevant for identifying and explaining psychiatric disorders. Knowl-
edge of the mechanisms can supplement, and help to identify the limits of, the
applicability domain over which a disorder is stably explainable. This knowledge
can also facilitate mitigating negative feedback effects.
Congruent mechanisms explain how feedbacks generate, reinforce and
maintain stabilizing loops between classifications and interactive kinds. Inten-
tionally mediated congruence ensues when the classification is found meaningful
andnatural by the classified so that, for example, it seems to explain and exonerate
one’s experience, condition and behaviour (see Hacking 1995b).7 According to
Mallon (2016, p. 73–93), classified behaviour as a social role can also be preferred
for strategical reasons, reinforced culturally and amplified by non-intentional
automatic processes. Hemaintains that these causal mechanismsmay lead, under
the right circumstances, to a social role becoming structurally entrenched in
social, material and institutional environments. The idea is that structurally
entrenched social roles are stable enough to be homeostatic property cluster kinds.
I interpret this so that the interaction between the mentioned psychological and
social mechanisms (and other factors) may form a feedback mechanism that
explains congruence between classifications and kinds.8 In this case, the
7 See also Appiah (2005) and Haslanger (2012).
8 The interaction between the mechanisms can be understood in the light of structural individ-
ualism, see Coleman (1990) and Hedström and Ylikoski (2010).
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classificatory practices and conceptions do not only provide opportunities and
constrain behaviours from above but also render the behaviours and experiences
meaningful and seemingly natural. However, the extent to which interactive
human kinds support scientifically relevant epistemic projects does not only
depend on the stability of the kinds, but also on our ability to explain their
properties under domain-relative alternative circumstances. Consequently, it is
crucial to identify how congruent mechanisms can supplement the domain over
which kinds are explainable.
Congruent mechanisms described by the labelling theory can explain why
classified members of a kind have a higher disposition to exhibit kind-typical
properties in contrast to unclassifiedmembers. The labelling theory describes how
labels cause the targeted people to adjust their behaviour and self-images to
conform to the labels, although it does not describe how this can reinforce the
theoretical beliefs associated with the labels. Becker’s (1953, 1963) account of the
labelling theory, for example, is based primarily on congruent mechanisms
mediated by intentional pathways. He argues that labels stick when individuals
learn and internalize the concepts and meanings associated with them. Scheff’s
(1966) account of the labelling theory, instead, concentrates more on the influence
of societal reactions andmaterial environments. However, a problemwith Scheff’s
approach is that when the inflicted individuals do not find their labels meaningful
and natural, they may oppose them. As an example, McLorg and Taub (1987)
demonstrate that while anorectics tend to vigorously and openly deny their label,
bulimics find their label moremeaningful and natural. The reason is that dieting is
not as readily conceived as deviant as excessive eating and vomiting. Moreover,
some critics (e.g. Gibbs 1971) of the labelling theory have argued that labels cannot
be the initial or primary cause of deviant acts because also unlabelled individuals
in similar situations perform them. The explanatory domain of the labelling theory
is limited especially in cases where there is an underlying psychiatric disorder
(cf. Gove 1975). Nevertheless, this does not rule out the fact that explanations based
on labels and feedback effects can supplement other explanations. According to
Link et al.’s (1989) modified labelling theory, for instance, limited social oppor-
tunities together with internalized expectations of being socially rejected, may
reinforce patterns of behaviour and conditions that have resulted from other
causes. In criminology, for example, labelling effects mediated by intentional and
structural mechanisms are used to predict the development of and propensity for
criminal behaviour.
Congruent feedback mechanisms can supplement the explanatory domain of
psychiatric disorders in several ways. This is illustrated by the already mentioned
anthropological study led by Luhrmann et al. (2015), which indicates that
schizophrenia voice hallucinations in the USA are harsh in comparison to Ghana
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and India, where they can be guiding and playful. The study and a book by
Luhrmann and Marrow (2016), seem to suggest that one of the reasons for the
voice-hearing experiences in the USA is that the prototypical expectations asso-
ciated with the diagnostic category bring about negative social consequences.9 In
theWest, the prototype of schizophrenia holds that it is chronic anddevastating. In
India and Ghana, on the other hand, patients and their families rarely know or
remember the diagnosis, but instead interpret the disorder’s symptoms in
culturally meaningful ways. This means that the individuals suffering from the
symptoms do not expect, or are not expected by others, to become failures in social
and professional life (p. 205). The stigmatizing conceptions associated with the
diagnostic label may also indirectly influence the severity and outcome of
schizophrenia. According to two major longitudinal studies of over 30 years con-
ducted by the WHO, people who had received a schizophrenia diagnosis, for
instance, in India, Nigeria and Columbia, suffered a milder form of the disorder
than peoplewith the diagnosis in the USA, Denmark and Taiwan (Hopper, Jenkins,
and Barret 2004). Approximately 50 per cent of the people diagnosed with
schizophrenia are less impaired in the global south than in the developed world
(Hopper et al. 2007). The dominant biomedical explanations of schizophrenia
consider the Western feedback effects as stable background conditions and are
therefore sensitive to the symptomatic, severity and outcome variations of the
disorder.10 If the feedback explanation is integrated to supplement the explana-
tion’s applicability domain, it becomes insensitive to these variations, while the
explanatory scope is widened to enable more precise comparisons between
different cultural, historical and individual manifestations of the disorder.
Incongruent mechanisms describe how feedbacks generate, reinforce and
maintain destabilizing loops between classifications and interactive kinds.
Intentionally mediated incongruence describes how a classification is found
meaningless, unpreferred or unnatural by the classified persons, and therefore
causes them individually or concertedly to act against it (seeHacking 2007a). As an
example, misclassifications can cause incongruence because they are found
unfitting and meaningless. Similarly, incongruence can be due to a mismatch
between a classificatory conception and the classified people’s perceived self-
images, experiences and behaviour. On the other hand, structurally mediated
incongruence describes how a new classification undermines the practices and
structures that brought about the behaviour in the first place, leading to alterations
in the classified people’s behaviours (Hacking 1995a, ch. 4; Mallon 2016, p. 172).
9 See also Kent and Wahass (1996), Mawson et al. (2011), Woods et al. (2014).
10 Pöyhönen (2010, 2013) makes a similar argument about norm dependency of bulimia.
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That is, as classified individuals succumb under changed structural constraints
and opportunities, theymay prefer, findmeaningful andnatural novel behaviours.
The cross-cultural application of the diagnostic categories in the DSM-5
and the ICD-10 psychiatric classification manuals causes incongruence. The
categories are primarily based on symptom delineations drawn from Western
patients and informed by Western folk psychology (e.g. individualistic view of
the self) (cf. La Roche, Fuentes, and Hinton 2015).11 Consequently, individuals
with different cultural backgrounds may be misdiagnosed, while correct
diagnoses can induce opposition because they are found stigmatizing by some
cultural minorities (cf. Kirmayer 2001). Both situations may lead to alterations in
the behaviour of the diagnosed individuals and thereby further distort theoretical
beliefs about the disorders. As part of “modernization” processes, the diagnostic
categories can bring about destabilizing cultural and social tensions by trans-
forming local structures and conceptions.12 By this Imean that the categoriesmay
distort or alter culturally different ways of experiencing, manifesting and coping
with psychiatric problems (see Kleinman 1988; see Kirmayer 2002). As an
example, Kitanaka (2012) argues that the moods labelled as depression in the
West were not commonly pathologized in Japan until the introduction of
the diagnostic category at the end of the 1990s. The diagnosis and the use of
antidepressants have induced unpredictable alterations in patients, leading to
further changes in the conception of depression (p. 184). A diagnostic category
can also become part of a causal process that enables a novel condition. As an
example, the conception of self-starvation as a sign of personal suffering (and the
idolization of slimness) interacts with local cultures in Asia, creating dynamic
and evolving forms of anorexia nervosa (Lee 1996; Pike and Dunne 2015). Finally,
research in cognitive science and psychology indicates that even underlying
cognitive mechanisms of disorders may be socially and culturally shaped
(Murphy 2015; Washington 2016). In the light of these examples, cross-cultural
research can supplement explanations of psychiatric disorders by undermining
some of the taken-for-grantedness of Western diagnostic feedback effects.
Incongruent feedback loops that describe the influence of non-epistemic
classificatory adjustments arguably represent the biggest obstacle for human
kinds to support epistemic projects (cf. Griffiths 1997; cf. Khalidi 2013). As an
example, the value-laden shifts in the conceptions associated with ADHD have
influenced those classified with the condition. The diagnostic category has strong
political and moral implications, and therefore motivates individuals as well as
11 Folk-psychological conceptions shape psychiatric disorders, see Luhrmann (2011).
12 Structural changes can also be instigated by endogenous cultural factors, see Sahlins (1985)
and Robbins (2004).
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larger interest groups to react. These include pressure from ADHD groups, con-
sisting of patients and their families, as well as lobbying from pharmaceutical
companies. Moreover, careless use of standardized scales has enabled individuals
who lack the symptom profile to pretend to have them, or to become diagnosed
mistakenly by the experts or themselves. The upshot is that the distorted picture of
ADHD may prompt behaviour reactions from both genuine and misdiagnosed
individuals (cf. Allen 2018). Although these changes are hard to explain and
anticipate, incongruent feedback explanations can help to identify how the
psychiatric disorder is unstable, and thereby contribute to its explanation and
classification.
The explanatory domain approach to interactive kinds supports classificatory
pluralism (cf. Dupré 1993). A good example is the culture-bound syndrome
latah found in South East Asia especially among older women in rural areas. The
syndrome’s symptoms include losing one’s self-control when startled by
mimicking, cursing and making vulgar gestures. A cultural explanation for the
syndrome can be that it is a ritualized role that permits individuals to violate
the normal social structure (Lee 1981; cf. Winzeler 1995). This implies that there is a
congruent loop between the cultural expectations associated with the role and the
pattern of behaviour. On the other hand, Simons (1996) argues that latah is a
culture-specific variation of a neurocognitive startle-matching syndrome that may
include Tourette’s and some other culture-specific conditions. In this light, feed-
back mechanisms could explain the local manifestations of the neurocognitive
kind. Moreover, latah (or some of its forms) could simultaneously be held as a
unique interactive kind upheld by the interaction of the neurocognitive mecha-
nism and the congruent feedback mechanism (cf. Murphy 2006, p. 276). This
means that whether a kind concept (and the property cluster it picks out) is split or
lumped depends on the underling mechanisms and the explanatory relevance set
by the discipline-dependent characterization of the explanandum.13 Indeed, when
classifications have different epistemic aims, they may benefit from carving the
property cluster kind differently (i.e. emphasizing different mechanisms), because
explanatory dimensions may have trade-offs (cf. Pöyhönen 2014). For instance,
clinical practice may benefit from psychiatric disorder concepts associated with
deep proximal explanations, whereas epidemiological approaches may prefer
disorder concepts associated with explanations with wide scopes (see Campaner
2014, p. 99). In some cases, there may also be a trade-off between shallower
explanations with wider time scopes and deeper explanations with limited time
scopes.
13 Psychiatric disorders with neurocognitive subtypes can be split or lumped based on the same
argument.
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Knowledge of the feedback mechanisms can inform treatment and policy
decisions by facilitating interventions that would weaken feedback and increase
positive congruence. Luhrmann and Marrow (2016, p. 220), for instance, suggest
that the diagnosis of schizophrenia should de-emphasize labelling and focus on
behaviour rather than inner experience. The upshot is that individuals could
find voice-experiences and treatments more positive and meaningful, which
would increase positive congruence (see Thomas et al. 2014). Feedback expla-
nations could also be implemented to mitigate or prevent incongruent effects of
exported Western diagnostic categories (see Kirmayer 2001). Even value-driven
incongruent loops could support some interventions based on models that
represent individual motivations (but cf. Steel 2008, p. 158). In short, congruent
explanations may facilitate precise domain-relative interventions because the
feedback models are relatively modular. On the other hand, although models of
incongruent mechanisms are non-modular or weakly modular, they may none-
theless enable preventive interventions. However, disseminating information
about classifications, or impeding their dissemination, can by itself influence
the classified people. Hence, modifying classifications based on feedback
knowledge does not so much describe classifying kinds more accurately, as
describing a co-fitting process that transforms both. This means that the
conceptual engineering that a feedback explanation enables is tantamount to
kind amending.
Lastly, although I have argued that there is no principled epistemic differ-
ence between interactive human and biological kinds, there may be a quantita-
tive explanatory difference. When the looping effect works through the direct or
indirect intentions of the classified humans, their reactions aremore fine-grained
than is the case with environmental looping effects of, for instance, disease
entities. The reason is that humans can rationalize, interpret and explain their
own behaviour in a fine-grained manner. This means that knowledge of the
looping effect is either relevant to enable stable explanations of human kinds, or
as with value-driven incongruent loops, to understanding why and how such
explanations are unstable and limited. This is exemplified by a self-diagnosing
psychiatrist who adjusts his or her behaviour to be congruent or opposed to even
the smallest diagnostic changes. The dependency could have systematic coun-
terfactual power under the right motives and constraints, or alternatively, it
could help to understand why such explanations are highly limited. On the other
hand, counterfactual dependencies between classificatory practices and the
behaviour of some disease entities are so course-grained, that they provide only
weak explanations and projections.
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4 Conclusions
I have defended a realistic account of interactive human kinds by arguing that
feedback explanations can supplement the explanatory domains over which the
kinds sustain epistemic projects. A feedback explanation’s explanatory relevance
depends on its ability towiden and deepen– enhance the domain of applicability–
ways of explaining a human kind. By applying this approach to empirical case
studies, I demonstrated that congruent mechanisms can supplement, in various
ways and degrees, the applicability domain of interactive human kinds, while
incongruent mechanisms can help to identify why the domain is unstable. How-
ever, because human categorizations and their effects are constantly reproduced
in social interactions, the epistemic projects that human kinds support are in
general not as stable as the projects that prototypical natural kinds support. The
underlying idea, nevertheless, is that whether an explanation of a human kind is
sufficiently stable depends on the discipline-relative epistemic aims set for the
explanatory domain.
An important implication of my account is that classificatory and diagnostic
practices should pay attention to the mechanisms that underlie the dynamics of
interactive kinds such as psychiatric disorders. Feedback explanations may not
only contribute to explaining the properties of kinds and predicting when a clas-
sificatory adjustment is needed, but also facilitate conceptual engineering and
thereby enable kind amendments. Just as criminology is used in assessing criminal
policy measures, feedback explanations could be implemented to predict and
mitigate the negative effects of diagnostic practices.14
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